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Abstract— The wireless medium contains domain-specific in-
formation that can be used to complement and enhance tradi-
tional security mechanisms. In this paper we propose ways to
exploit the fact that, in a typically rich scattering environment,
the radio channel response decorrelates quite rapidly in space.
Specifically, we describe a physical-layer algorithm that combines
channel probing (M complex frequency response samples over
a bandwidth W ) with hypothesis testing to determine whether
current and prior communication attempts are made by the same
user (same channel response). In this way, legitimate users can
be reliably authenticated and false users can be reliably detected.
To evaluate the feasibility of our algorithm, we simulate spatially
variable channel responses in real environments using the WiSE
ray-tracing tool; and we analyze the ability of a receiver to
discriminate between transmitters (users) based on their channel
frequency responses in a given office environment. For several
rooms in the extremities of the building we considered, we have
confirmed the efficacy of our approach under static channel con-
ditions. For example, measuring five frequency response samples
over a bandwidth of 100 MHz and using a transmit power of
100 mW, valid users can be verified with 99% confidence while
rejecting false users with greater than 95% confidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
As wireless devices become increasingly pervasive and
essential, they are becoming both a target for attack and
the very weapon with which such an attack can be carried
out. Traditional high-level computer and network security
techniques can, and must, play an important role in combating
such attacks, but the wireless environment presents both the
means and the opportunity for new forms of intrusion. The
devices that comprise a wireless network environment are low-
cost commodity items that are easily available to potential
intruders and also easily modifiable for such intrusion. In
particular, wireless networks are open to intrusion from the
outside without the need for a physical connection and, as a
result, techniques which would provide a high level of security
in a wired network have proven inadequate in a wireless
network, as many motivated groups of students have readily
demonstrated [1]–[3].
Although conventional cryptographic security mechanisms
are essential to securing wireless networks, these techniques
do not directly leverage the unique properties of the wireless
domain to address security threats. The physical properties
of the wireless medium are a powerful source of domain-
specific information that can be used to complement and
The authors may be reached at {lxiao, ljg, narayan,
trappe}@winlab.rutgers.edu. This research is supported, in part, through a
grant CNS-0626439 from the National Science Foundation.
enhance traditional security mechanisms. In this paper, we
propose that a cross-layer approach can be used to augment
the security of wireless networks. In particular, we believe
that the nature of the wireless medium can be turned to the
advantage of the network engineer when trying to secure
wireless communications. The enabling factor in our approach
is that, in the rich multipath environment typical of wireless
scenarios, the response of the medium along any transmit-
receive path is frequency-selective (or in the time domain,
dispersive) in a way that is location-specific. This means:
1) The channel can be specified by a number of complex
samples either in the frequency domain (a set of complex
gains at a set of frequencies) or the time domain (a set
of impulse response samples at a set of time delays).
2) Such sets of numbers decorrelate from one transmit-
receive path to another if the paths are separated by the
order of an RF wavelength or more.
Using the uniqueness of the channel between two locations, we
believe it is possible to establish new forms of authentication
that include information available at the physical layer. Rather
than rely solely on higher-layer cryptographic mechanisms,
wireless devices can authenticate themselves based upon their
ability to produce an appropriate signal at the recipient.
While using the physical layer to enhance security might
seem to be a radical paradigm shift for wireless systems, we
note that this is not the first time that multipath and advanced
physical layer methods have proven advantageous. Specifi-
cally, we are encouraged in our belief by two notable parallel
paradigm shifts in wireless systems: (1) code division multiple
access (CDMA) systems [4], where the use of Rake processing
transforms multipath into a diversity-enhancing benefit; and
(2) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna techniques
[5], which transform scatter-induced Rayleigh fading into a
capacity-enhancing benefit.
In order to support the use of physical layer information
for enhancing wireless security, it is necessary to understand
the degree to which physical layer measurements can serve
to discriminate between transmitters, and then to place this
functionality in the context of a greater end-to-end security
framework. In this paper, we tackle the first of these problems
by providing an initial investigation into the ability of a
receiver to distinguish between transmitters.
We begin the paper in Section II by providing an overview
of our proposed PHY-layer authentication service. We then
examine the possibilities of achieving physical-layer authenti-
cation using a hypothesis testing framework in Section III. In
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Fig. 1. The adversarial multipath environment involving multiple scattering
surfaces. The transmission from Alice (A) to Bob (B) experiences different
multipath effects than the transmission by the adversary, Eve (E).
order to validate our ideas, we have performed simulations
using the WiSE propagation tool, and our results are in
Section IV. Our objective is to understand the degree to which
physical layer authentication is possible, and hence our initial
performance studies reported in this paper are for a benign,
static multipath environment. We wrap up the paper in Section
V by providing concluding remarks and highlighting important
areas for further investigation.
II. PROBLEM OVERVIEW
Traditionally, authentication involves the verification of an
entity’s identity. In the context of physical layer authentication,
however, we are not interested in identity, per se, but rather are
interested in recognizing a particular transmitter device. The
ability to distinguish between different transmitters would be
particularly valuable in real wireless systems, as it would help
prevent spoofing attacks, where one wireless device claims
to be another wireless device. Currently, spoofing attacks are
very easy to launch in many wireless networks. For example,
in commodity networks, such as 802.11 networks, it is easy
for a device to alter its MAC address by simply issuing an
ifconfig command. This weakness is a serious threat, and
there are numerous attacks, ranging from session hijacking
[6] to attacks on access control lists [2], that are facilitated by
the fact that an adversarial device may masquerade as another
device.
Here, we seek to develop the notion of physical-layer
authentication services by making use of the complexity asso-
ciated with multipath propagation. Throughout the discussion,
we shall borrow from the conventional terminology of the
security community by introducing three different parties:
Alice, Bob and Eve. For our purposes, these three entities
may be be thought of as wireless transmitters/receivers that are
potentially located in spatially separated positions, as depicted
in Figure 1. Our two “legal” protagonists are the usual Alice
and Bob, and for the sake of discussion throughout this paper,
Alice will serve as the transmitter that initiates communication,
while Bob will serve as the intended receiver. Their nefarious
adversary, Eve, will serve as an active opponent who injects
undesirable communications into the medium in the hopes of
impersonating Alice.
Our security objective, broadly speaking, is to provide
authentication between Alice and Bob, despite the presence
of Eve. Authentication is traditionally associated with the
assurance that a communication comes from a specific entity
[7]. Returning to our communication scenario, this objective
may be interpreted as follows. Since there is a potential
adversary, Eve, who is within range of Alice and Bob, and who
is capable of injecting her own signals into the environment to
impersonate Alice, it is desirable for Bob to have the ability
to differentiate between legitimate signals from Alice and
illegitimate signals from Eve. He therefore needs some form
of evidence that the signal he receives did, in fact, come from
Alice.
In a multipath environment, the property of rapid spatial
decorrelation can be used to authenticate a transmitter. To
illustrate this, let us return to Figure 1 and consider a simple
transmitter identification protocol in which Bob seeks to verify
that Alice is the transmitter. Suppose that Alice probes the
channel sufficiently frequently to assure temporal coherence
between channel estimates and that, prior to Eve’s arrival,
Bob has estimated the Alice-Bob channel. Now, Eve wishes
to convince Bob that she is Alice. Bob will require that
each information-carrying transmission be accompanied by
an authenticator signal. The channel and its effect on a
transmitted signal between Alice and Bob is a result of the
multipath environment. Bob may use the received version of
the authenticator signal to estimate the channel response and
compare this with a previous record for the Alice-Bob channel.
If the two channel estimates are “close” to each other, then
Bob will conclude that the source of the message is the same
as the source of the previously sent message. If the channel
estimates are not similar, then Bob should conclude that the
source is likely not Alice.
There are several important issues related to such a pro-
cedure that should be addressed before it can be a viable
authentication mechanism. First is the specification of the
authenticator signal that is used to probe the channel. There are
many standardized techniques to probe the channel, ranging
from pulse-style probing to multi-tonal probing [8], and we
may use these techniques to estimate the channel response.
Regardless of what probing method is employed, the channel
response can be characterized in the frequency domain, and
throughout this paper we will represent our channels in that
domain.
Next, at the heart of our idea, we use the fact in a richly
scattered multipath environment (typical of indoor wireless en-
vironments) it is difficult for an adversary to create or precisely
model a waveform that is transmitted and received by entities
that are more than a wavelength away from the adversary.
The difficulty of an adversary to predict the environment is
supported by the well-known Jakes uniform scattering model
[9], which states that the received signal rapidly decorrelates
over a distance of roughly half a wavelength, and that spatial
separation of one to two wavelengths is sufficient for assuming
independent fading paths. The implication of such a scattering
model in a transmitter identification application remains to
be tested, and one of the objectives behind this study is to
examine the utility of a typical indoor multipath environment
for discriminating between Alice-Bob and Eve-Bob channels.
It should also be noted that the multipath channel will change
3with time due to both terminal mobility and changes in the
environment. As mentioned earlier, in practice it will be
necessary to guarantee the continuity of the authentication
procedure by probing the channel at time intervals less than
the channel’s coherence time. However, even before issues
of temporal variability can be brought into the picture, it is
necessary to first examine the ability to distinguish between
transmitters in a static multipath environment. This paper
examines the ability to authenticate transmitters in such an
environment, and serves to illustrate the potential for new
forms of physical layer security.
III. ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide a formulation of physical layer
authentication as a hypothesis testing problem.
A. System Model
We assume that Bob first measures and stores the frequency
response of the channel connecting Alice with him. Though
the true channel response is HAB(f), Bob stores a noisy
version, HˆAB(f), due to his receiver noise. After a while,
he has to decide whether a transmitting terminal is still
Alice, his decision being based on a noisy measured version,
Hˆt(f), of that terminal’s channel response to Bob (the true
response being Ht(f)). By sampling HˆAB(f) and Hˆt(f),
f ∈ (fo −W/2, fo +W/2], Bob obtains two vectors HˆAB
and Hˆt,
HˆAB = HABe
jφ1 +N
1
(1)
Hˆt = Hte
jφ2 +N
2
(2)
where the elements of vector A = [A1, · · · , AM ]T are samples
from A(f). More specifically, Am = A(fo −W/2 +m∆f),
m = 1, · · · ,M , where ∆f = W/M ; M is the sample size;
W is the measurement bandwidth; fo is the center frequency
of the measurement; and all elements of N
1
and N
2
are i.i.d
complex Gaussian noise samples CN(0, σ2). Considering the
fact that the phase of Bob’s receiver local oscillator (LO) can
change between one measurement and another, we introduce
φ1 and φ2 ∈ [0, 2pi) to represent measurement errors in the
phase of the channel frequency response.
B. Hypothesis Testing
Bob uses a simple hypothesis test [10] to decide if the
transmitting terminal is Alice or a would-be intruder, e.g., Eve.
The null hypothesis, H0, is that the terminal is not an intruder,
i.e. the claimant is Alice; and Bob accepts this hypothesis if
the test statistic he computes, L, is below some threshold, k.
Otherwise, he accepts the alternative hypothesis, H1, that the
claimant terminal is someone else.
H0 :Ht = HAB (3)
H1 :Ht 6= HAB (4)
The test statistic is chosen to be
L = min
φ
1
σ2
M∑
m=1
| Hˆtm − HˆABme
jφ |2 . (5)
The minimization over the phase φ is necessary to account
for measurement errors in the phase of the frequency response,
φ1 and φ2. Without this adjustment by Bob, the transmitting
terminal can be rejected even if it is in fact Alice. It is easy
to show that the minimizing value of φ is
φ∗ = Arg(
M∑
m=1
HˆtmHˆ
∗
ABm). (6)
For the sake of analytical tractability, we will use for φ∗
the value corresponding to a noiseless channel (HˆAB(f) =
HAB(f) and Hˆt(t) = Ht(f)); for the high-SNR conditions
where the system must operate, this is a very reasonable
approximation.
Subject to this approximation, it is easy to show that, when
the transmitting terminal is Alice, the test statistic L is a chi-
square random variable with 2M degrees of freedom [11],
i.e.,
L =
1
σ2
(
M∑
m=1
n2rm +
M∑
m=1
n2im
)
∼ χ2
2M,0, (7)
where nrm and nim are i.i.d Gaussian variables N(0, σ2).
When the transmitting terminal is Eve, however, L becomes a
non-central chi-square variable with a non-centrality parameter
µL, i.e.,
L =
1
σ2
(
M∑
m=1
(∆h∗rm + nrm)
2 +
M∑
m=1
(∆h∗im + nim)
2
)
∼ χ2
2M,µL
, (8)
where ∆h∗rm and ∆h∗im are the real and imaginary part of
(HEBm − HABmejφ∗ ), respectively, with φ∗ given by (6),
and µL = 1σ2
∑M
m=1 | HEBm −HABme
jφ∗ |2.
We define the rejection region for H0 as L > k, where k is
the threshold. Thus, the “false alarm rate” (or Type I error) is
α = PH0(L > k) = 1− Fχ2
2M
(k), (9)
and the “miss rate” (or Type II error) is
β = PH1(L < k) = Fχ2
2M,µL
(k), (10)
where FX(·) is the CDF of the random variable X . For a
specified α, the threshold of the test is k = F−1
χ2
2M
(1 − α),
and the miss rate is β = Fχ2
2M,µL
(F−1
χ2
2M
(1 − α)), which
decreases with µL. More specifically, with α fixed, β rises
with σ2 (because k does) and falls with ∑Mm=1 | HEBm −
HABme
jφ∗ |2.
IV. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulating the Transfer Functions
In order to test the proposed scheme, it is necessary to model
not only “typical” channel responses, but the spatial variability
of these responses. Only in that way can we discern the success
in detecting would-be intruders like Eve. To that end, we
make use of the WiSE tool, a ray-tracing software package
developed by Bell Laboratories [12]. One input to WiSE
is the 3-dimensional plan of a specific building, including
4walls, floors, ceilings and their material properties. With this
information, WiSE can predict the rays at any receiver from
any transmitter, including their amplitudes, phases and delays.
From this, it is straightforward to construct the transmit-
receive frequency response over any specified interval.
We have done this for one particular office building, for
which a top view of the first floor is shown in Fig. 2. This
floor of this building is 120 meters long, 14 meters wide and
4 meters high. For our numerical experiment, we placed Bob
in the hallway (the filled-in circle) at a height of 2 m. For the
positions of Alice and Eve, we considered four rooms at the
extremities of the building (shown shaded). For each room, we
assumed Alice and Eve both transmitted from a height of 2
m, each of them being anywhere on a uniform horizontal grid
of points with 0.2-meter separations. With Ns grid points in
a room, there were Ns(Ns− 1)/2 possible pairs of Alice-Eve
positions. For Rooms 1, 2, 3 and 4, the numbers of grid points
were Ns = 150, 713, 315 and 348, respectively. For each
Alice-Eve pair, (1) WiSE was used to generate the Alice-Bob
and Eve-Bob channel responses (HAB(f) and HEB(f)); and
(2) the hypothesis test described above was used to compute β
for a specified α. The set of all β-values in a room were used to
compute a room-specific mean, β, for each of several selected
combinations of bandwidth (W ), number of tones (M ) and
transmit power (PT ).
B. Transmit Power and Receiver Noise
Assume that, in conjunction with WiSE, we obtain the var-
ious transfer functions as dimensionless ratios (e.g., received
E-field/transmitted E-field). Then the proper treatment of the
noise variance, σ2, in the hypothesis test is to define it as the
receiver noise power per tone, PN , divided by the transmit
power per tone, PT /M , where PT is the total transmit power.
Noting that PN = κTNF b, where κT is the thermal noise
density in mW/Hz, NF is the receiver noise figure, and b is
the measurement noise bandwidth per tone in Hz, we can write
σ2 =
κTNF b
PT /M
=
M
Γ
(11)
where PT is in mW, Γ = PT /PN and we will henceforth refer
to Γ by its decibel value.
C. Simulation Results
In the simulations, we set α = 0.01, f0 = 5 GHz, NF = 10,
and Γ = 90, 100, 110, 120 dB, which may be viewed as
combinations of b = 2.5 MHz and PT = 0.1, 1, 10, 100
mW, respectively. As noted earlier, we place Alice and Eve on
dense grids in each of four rooms at the corners of a particular
building, with Bob in the hallway, Fig. 2.
We obtain a miss rate β for each Alice-Eve pair, and then
calculate the mean value β for each room with M = 1 ∼ 10
and W = 0.05 ∼ 0.5 GHz. The results verify the utility of our
algorithm and show that, if PT = 100 mW, most values of β
are below 0.05, even at the farthest corners of the building.
Figures 3-6 show our computed results for Rooms 1-4, re-
spectively. They show that, in terms of minimizing β, increas-
ing transmit power can be most beneficial, while increasing the
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Fig. 2. System topology assumed in the simulations. Bob is located at [45.6,
6.2, 3.0] m in a 120 m × 14 m × 4 m office building. Alice and Eve are
located on dense grids at a height of 2 m. The sizes of the grids areNs = 150,
713, 315, and 348, respectively, for Room 1, 2, 3 and 4.
bandwidth and number of tones has less impact. In all cases,
there is little benefit (or even a deficit) in increasing M beyond
∼ 5; and in most cases, there is little benefit in increasing W
beyond ∼ 100− 200 MHz. This finding, however, applies to
the case where there are no temporal variations in the levels
or shapes of the transfer functions, a topic we discuss in the
last section.
Finally, the figures show the effects of distance (path
length), which influences the per-tone signal-to-noise ratios
at Bob’s receiver. Rooms 3 and 4, which are farther from
Bob than Rooms 1 and 2, have clearly poorer performance in
rejecting Eve. Since the four rooms are at the building extrem-
ities, we can assume that this set of results lower-bounds the
capabilities of our PHY-layer authentication algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
We have described and studied a physical layer technique
for enhancing authentication in a wireless in-building en-
vironment. The technique uses channel frequency response
measurements and hypothesis testing to discriminate between
a legitimate user (Alice) and a would-be intruder (Eve). The
study used the ray-tracing tool WiSE to generate realistic spa-
tially varied responses, and results were obtained for several
most-distant (i.e., worst-case) rooms of one particular building.
They confirm the efficacy of the algorithm for realistic values
of the measurement bandwidth (e.g., W ∼ 100 MHz), number
of response samples (e.g., M ≤ 5) and transmit power
(e.g., PT ∼ 100 mW). Computed results not shown here
(but suggested by the left side of Fig. 3a) indicate good
performance down to W = 20 MHz, so that the method can
be used within bandwidths typical of existing WLANs.
Moving forward, further investigation is needed to test other
buildings and to look at multiple Bob locations within the
same building, thereby establishing required power levels for
a wider class of cases. Another important topic is the temporal
variations of the measured channel responses, e.g., variations
due to movements within the building, slow time changes
in the transmit power and/or receiver noise level, etc. Our
preliminary investigations in [13] have confirmed the efficacy
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Fig. 3. Results for Room 1. Alice and Eve are placed within Room 1, while
Bob is located in the center of the building, as depicted in Fig. 2. For each
combination of Alice and Eve locations, the corresponding channel responses
to Bob were used to estimate the miss rate. The average miss rate for Room
1, β, is reported as: (a) a function of bandwidth (W ) for fixed number of
tones (M ); and (b) as a function of M for fixed W .
of our approach in time-variant channels and showed that the
temporal variations even improve the performance in some
cases. Finally, as part of our ongoing efforts, we are work-
ing to integrate physical layer authentication into a holistic
cross-layer framework for wireless security that will augment
traditional “higher-layer” network security mechanisms with
physical layer methods.
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Fig. 5. The average miss rate, β, for Room 3, is reported as: (a) a function
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Fig. 6. The average miss rate, β, for Room 4, is reported as: (a) a function
of bandwidth (W ) for fixed number of tones (M ); and (b) as a function of
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